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This is the text of the IFS Annual Lecture 1994 delivered at the Chartered
Accountants’ Hall, London on 1 June 1994.
I. INTRODUCTION
I was delighted to be asked to give the IFS Annual Lecture for 1994, not least
because of my own connections with the Institute. These began with my
participation in the meetings of IFS, and continued as a member of the Meade
Committee in the 1970s. The work of that Committee — led by James Meade
and Donald Ironside — proved to be one of the formative experiences of my
professional career and led to my collaboration with John Kay on our book, The
British Tax System. The Meade Committee Report represented a turning-point in
the history of IFS, and since then it has gone from strength to strength under the
successive leadership of Dick Taverne, John Kay, Bill Robinson and, now,
Andrew Dilnot. I would like to take this opportunity to welcome the recent
initiative to set up a Tax Law Review Committee. I know that IFS is seeking 50
sponsors to underwrite this venture, and I am happy to announce this evening
that the Bank will be one of those 50.
                                                                                                                                   
1 Chief Economist, Bank of England.
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Although very different institutions, IFS and the Bank of England share one
important feature — both are advisers to government rather than responsible for
setting policy directly. Their influence depends upon the quality of the analysis
which they present. In the modern world, central banks must rely more on a
willingness and ability to explain and convince, and less on the power of
mystique. The proposition that winning the intellectual argument is a means of
acquiring and maintaining credibility will be a theme of my lecture. But the title
of my lecture should prompt one question. Why is the Institute for Fiscal
Studies’s Annual Lecture on the subject of monetary policy? There are two
answers. First, inflation is a tax. Indeed, in some countries, seigniorage is an
important source of government revenue. To take one example, in Chile,
seigniorage amounted to over 20 per cent of total government revenue in 1992.
But, in the G7 countries, the inflation tax accounts for around only 0–2 per cent
of total revenue, and even less in the UK where holdings of currency are
comparatively small. In the major economies, the effect of inflation, in a less
than perfectly indexed tax system, is to create distortions in the tax treatment of
saving and investment, even if inflation is completely anticipated. These
distortions were a major theme of the Meade Report. There is a further analogy
between unanticipated inflation and taxation. High and variable inflation — and
the two go together — create arbitrary redistributions of wealth and so constitute
a random wealth tax. No public finance economist would advocate the latter, so
we should not tolerate the former.
Second, although the course of tax reform is far from run (especially in the
area of savings), the focus of interest in economic policy over the past two years
has surely been monetary policy. There have been major changes in both the
economic and institutional framework of monetary policy. These deserve to be
discussed at greater length than was possible in the hectic months following our
departure from the ERM during which the new framework was evolving.
When my predecessor, John Flemming, gave this lecture four years ago, he
chose to speak on fiscal policy. I recall him saying then that in the relationship
between the Bank and the Treasury, both sides marked each other very tightly,
with the Treasury covering monetary policy and markets and the Bank watching
closely over fiscal policy. Although communication with opposite numbers is
well-developed in government, I imagine the system John was describing was
more one of zonal defence than man-to-man marking. And since that time, both
teams have acquired new managers with a preference for a more open style of
play.
Since IFS was set up in 1969, inflation in Britain has averaged almost 9 per
cent a year. Last month, inflation, excluding the effect of changes in mortgage
interest payments, fell to 2.3 per cent, the lowest figure recorded since that
particular index was constructed. Figure 1 shows monthly inflation figures from
1990 to April this year. Two series are shown: the government’s measure of
underlying inflation, denoted by RPIX, and the Bank of England’s (RPIY)Monetary Policy in the UK
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measure, which excludes the impact not only of mortgage interest payments but
also of indirect and local authority taxes. Measured in this way, inflation fell to
only 1.6 per cent in April.
FIGURE 1
UK Inflation, 1990−94
Note: RPIY = RPIX excluding VAT, local authority and excise duties (Bank calculations)
Source: Bank of England
Monetary policy is aimed at keeping inflation below 2½ per cent by the end
of this Parliament. How is this to be achieved? Will the sacrifice in lost output
and employment that was made to bring inflation down prove to be in vain?
Reducing inflation is like giving up smoking. It can be done often and frequently
is. The challenge is to do it only once, and kick the habit for good.
In this lecture, I want to explain the basis of the inflation target approach to
monetary policy and how the institutional changes to the framework of monetary
policy which have been introduced since our departure from the ERM, and
which are designed to enhance the transparency and openness of policy, give us
a good chance of achieving the objective. I shall organise the lecture around four
questions:




























































(2) What is the framework for monetary policy which replaced our membership
of the ERM?
(3) How, in practice, are decisions on interest rates made in the new
framework?
(4) Why are transparency and openness important to the success of the new
framework?
II. OBJECTIVES OF POLICY: INFLATION AND GROWTH
The reason for the Bank’s commitment to price stability is simple. Inflation —
and the macroeconomic instability associated with it — have proved costly to the
UK economy and unpopular with the electorate. It is possible to control inflation
— not precisely nor quickly, but within a reasonable range over a period of time.
And to do so does not require a sacrifice of other economic objectives. It is hard
to see how any long-run strategy for improving the economic performance of the
UK would not include the objective of price stability. Friedman (1960, p. 9)
argued that ‘The failure of government to provide a stable monetary framework
has thus been a major if not the major factor accounting for our really severe
inflations and depressions’. This proposition does, I think, seriously understate
the role of real shocks to the economy, but we can agree with Friedman (1960, p.
23) that it is essential ‘to prevent monetary arrangements from themselves
becoming a primary source of instability’.
Of course, governments are rightly concerned with a much wider range of
issues, many of which are more relevant to the fundamental objective of raising
the long-run rate of economic growth than is the control of inflation. But that is
no more an argument for tolerating inflation than would be a refusal to take
medicine for a cold on the grounds that the treatment was not the elixir of eternal
youth. Indeed, a government which expressed indifference to the inflation rate
would reveal its reluctance to give up the option of raising revenue by resort to
the printing press, raising doubts about the likely consistency over time of its
other policies.
In the 20 years following the end of the Second World War, such a view was
not generally accepted. The task of government was seen as judging the
appropriate trade-off between output and inflation. The aim was to choose the
optimal point on the Phillips curve. But, in the 1960s and 1970s, the trade-off
deteriorated and it became apparent that there was no real long-run trade-off to
exploit — in the long run, the Phillips curve is vertical. It is a pity that the
empirical regularity discovered by Phillips was misused. Phillips himself did not
think of it as his best work (‘done just in a weekend’ in his own words) and did
not encourage the popular interpretation. He wrote that the main objective of
policy was ‘to prevent continually rising prices of consumer goods’ (Phillips,
1958, p. 299). As Leeson (1994, p. 616) argues in the current issue of the
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least, while the curve with which he was eponymously associated, was used, by
others, to justify the policy of tolerating inflation in order to achieve
permanently low levels of unemployment, which he had specifically cautioned
against’.
We still know rather little about the nature of the long-run trade-off between
inflation and output. A climate of low and stable inflation will, because it avoids
the arbitrary redistributions of a random wealth tax, encourage investment
which, in turn, may raise the rate of productivity growth. In an international
cross-section study of 80 countries, Fischer (1993) found a negative correlation
between inflation and total factor productivity growth over the period 1961–88.
Although other investigators have produced similar findings, not all studies have
found a clear negative correlation. Be that as it may, let me briefly explore the
cost–benefit analysis of policies to reduce inflation which have the property that
by accepting lower output in the short term, it is possible to raise growth in the
long term. Assume that it were possible to raise the rate of productivity growth
indefinitely by one-hundredth of one percentage point, from 2.5 per cent a year
to 2.51 per cent a year, for example. If future incomes grow at the rate g and are
discounted at the real rate r, then the present discounted value of the benefits of
such a policy expressed as a proportion of current GDP, denoted by b, would be
as shown in Table 1. At a growth rate of 2.5 per cent a year, and with a real
discount rate of 4 per cent a year, the benefits of this very small increase in the
growth rate are very large — 44 per cent of current GDP. On this basis, the costs
of inflation appear extremely high. But since the policy involves depressing
output in the short run, the benefits are likely to be correlated with current
output, and so a risk premium should be incorporated into the discount rate. At a
discount rate of 7.5 per cent, closer to the real return on equities, the benefits fall
to only 4 per cent of current output.
TABLE 1
Cost-Benefit Analysis of Inflation Reduction
Benefits
b =
1 g = 2.5%, r = 4
b = 44%
2 g = 2.5%, r = 7.5%
b = 4%
Costs
c = 0.55 ✕  (sacrifice ratio = 5.8%) = 3.2%
Break-even discount rate is 8.1%.Fiscal Studies
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Fischer’s estimate of the fall in inflation required to bring about an increase
in the growth rate of 0.01 percentage points is 0.55 percentage points a year.
What is the short-run output cost of achieving a reduction in inflation of this
magnitude? Ball (1993) has produced estimates of sacrifice ratios for nine major
industrial countries (the G7 plus Australia and Switzerland). The average
sacrifice ratio — defined as the cumulative lost output per percentage point
reduction in inflation — is 5.8 per cent of one year’s GDP. Hence the cost of
reducing inflation by enough to raise growth by 0.01 percentage points is c =
(.55) ✕  (5.8%), approximately 3.2 per cent of one year’s output. With these
numbers, the benefits of lowering inflation exceed the costs at any discount rate
below 8.1 per cent.
I am myself rather sceptical about such calculations. They are clearly very
sensitive to the discount rate assumed. And there is no proof of any causal link
from inflation to growth. The most likely explanation of the negative correlation
between inflation and growth is that both high inflation and low growth
(adjusted for the contribution of factor inputs) reflect a lack of ‘good
governance’ in a country. But on one thing we can be clear — recent research
makes it very difficult to argue that inflation is good for long-run growth. And
that is sufficient to make the case that monetary policy should aim at price
stability.
An argument which runs in the opposite direction is that the cost of bringing
down inflation is a lower level of output not only during the recession but also in
the long run. This is because a recession lowers investment, labour supply and
productivity. It is not difficult to construct models which do have this property
— whether of hysteresis effects in the labour market or endogenous growth
models in which the current level of investment affects the rate of productivity
growth. These models have the implication that there is a trade-off between
current inflation and future output. A surprise inflation today, which stimulates
activity, may lead to higher output in the future. But a continuing inflation will
not generate further beneficial effects, and in the long run the optimal policy is
to return to price stability. Higher inflation does not lead to higher long-run
growth — even in models where a recession lowers the level of output
indefinitely, in itself a rather extreme position. Hence such models do not
provide any justification for a policy of permanently positive inflation; rather,
they point to the existence of an optimal path of adjustment from whatever is the
current rate of inflation to price stability. That is always an issue for a central
bank. It is not usually sensible to adjust to price stability overnight. And in the
latter stages of our membership of the ERM, there was a concern that adjustment
to stable prices might have become too rapid. But the counterpart to this
observation is that, once low inflation has been achieved, as it has in the UK, it
can be very costly to let it rise.
If it is important to be clear about the objectives of policy, then it is
reasonable to ask what we mean by price stability. The definition proposed byMonetary Policy in the UK
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Alan Greenspan, Chairman of the US Federal Reserve, has become widely
accepted: ‘For all practical purposes, price stability means that expected changes
in the average price level are small enough and gradual enough that they do not
materially enter business and household decisions’. Chairman Greenspan’s new
deputy, Alan Blinder, has suggested a variant: ‘Price stability is when ordinary
people stop talking about inflation’. The useful aspect of this definition is that it
reminds us of the consequences of the long and variable time lags between
changes in monetary policy and their impact on inflation. For the role of the
central bank is to think — indeed worry — about inflation before ordinary
people start talking about it.
That is why the Bank has no time for those who say that ‘inflation is dead’.
This is a wholly inappropriate metaphor. Inflation is not a beast to be hunted and
then slain once and for all. It is a process which reflects the stance of monetary
policy. And I shall suggest a more appropriate metaphor at the end of my lecture.
III. THE FRAMEWORK FOR MONETARY POLICY
After 16 September 1992, which I shall call ‘Grey Wednesday’ for reasons to be
explained later, it was necessary to put in place a new framework for monetary
policy. This had two key elements. The first was an explicit inflation target. The
second was a degree of openness in the making of policy unprecedented in UK
monetary history, of which the most visible signs are the Bank of England’s
Inflation Report and the publication of the minutes of the monthly monetary
meetings between the Chancellor and Governor. I shall return to openness later;
let me first discuss the origins of the inflation target.
The history of monetary policy in the UK over the past 20 years has been the
search for a nominal framework that would provide an anchor for the price level
and credibility for the government’s commitment to low inflation. Several
frameworks were tried and, if not discarded, at least seriously modified. Targets
for the monetary aggregates were introduced in the 1970s, first for broad money,
subsequently for narrow money. Attention then switched to the exchange rate,
first with an informal target and then with membership of the ERM, with its
explicit exchange rate target expressed in terms of the narrow band. Finally,
following various crises in the ERM, several countries have now adopted an
explicit inflation target, following the earlier lead of New Zealand and Canada.
As can be seen from Table 2, it is not just the UK but also Sweden, Finland and
a number of other countries which have moved in this direction.
Following our departure from the ERM in 1992, it was clear that, because of
the problems which German unification had created for the ERM, any new
framework would have to be based on domestic indicators of economic
performance. The Treasury and Bank discussed the alternatives, and the
government moved quickly to announce a new framework built around an
explicit inflation target. On 8 October 1992, the then Chancellor, NormanFiscal Studies
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Lamont, wrote to the Chairman of the Treasury and Civil Service Committee to
set out the new arrangements. Having reaffirmed the government’s commitment
to the importance of bringing inflation down, the Chancellor continued:
I believe it would be helpful to go rather further in quantifying this objective. For the
remainder of this Parliament, I propose to set ourselves the objective of keeping underlying
inflation [defined as the change in retail prices excluding mortgage interest payments]
within a range of 1–4 per cent, and I believe by the end of the Parliament we need to be in
the lower part of the range.
Mr Lamont added that ‘we need to aim at a rate of inflation in the long term of 2
per cent or less’.
TABLE 2
Inflation Targets
Canada Governor and Finance Minister jointly announce the inflation
reduction target.
1–3 per cent band between 1995 and1998.
Finland Target to stabilise underlying inflation permanently at 2 per cent by
1995.
Mexico President announces inflation target at the State of Union Address in
November for the forthcoming year. The current target is 5 per cent
by end of December 1994.
New Zealand Price stability defined by Policy Targets Agreement (PTA) signed by
the Minister of Finance and Governor.
To maintain inflation between 0 and 2 per cent.
Portugal Policy target ranges 4–5½ per cent 1994, 3–4¼ per cent 1995.
Sweden Mediurn-term target (from 1995) for underlying inflation of 2 per
cent with a ± 1 percentage point margin.
UK RPIX of 1–4 per cent during the current parliamentary term with the
aim of being in the lower part of the range by end of the current
Parliament.
Why an inflation target? The basic reason, in my view, is that an inflation
target embodies the view that inflation is the ultimate objective of monetary
policy. It also corresponds most closely with the actual practice of central banks.
Even if explained in terms of adherence to an intermediate monetary target, most
successful monetary authorities base their policy actions on a forward-looking
assessment of the likely direction in which inflation is headed, and change policy
if the prospect for inflation appears undesirable. Experience with intermediate
targets in a number of countries suggests that they can only too often be
unreliable guides to future inflation. That does not mean that they should beMonetary Policy in the UK
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jettisoned entirely. Take the example of monetary aggregates. Money is at the
heart of the inflationary process, and it would be bizarre for a central bank not to
pay careful attention to the behaviour of the monetary aggregates. But there is no
time-invariant mechanical link between the change in a given monetary
aggregate and the subsequent out-turn for inflation. In other words, the velocity
of circulation changes over time in unpredictable ways. Denis Healey, in
evidence to the Treasury and Civil Service Committee in July last year, recalled
the time when, as Chancellor, he asked Jasper Hollom — the then Deputy
Governor of the Bank — whether he should publish a monetary target. Hollom
replied, ‘You would simply be redesigning your cross’. Figure 2 shows that
cross, the ‘velocity cross’. It plots the velocity of both narrow money (M0) and
broad money (M4) in the UK since 1980. The velocity of narrow money rose
rapidly in the 1980s as new ways were discovered to economise on holdings of
cash. Broad money velocity fell during the 1980s when the effects of financial
liberalisation meant that money became interest-bearing and an important part of
FIGURE 2
Velocity of M0 and M4, 1980–94
































wealth, and not just a means of payment. Even the Bundesbank has recently
experienced problems in predicting the behaviour of broad money velocity. It is
tempting, though a little unfair, to say that the Bundesbank has given more
credibility to monetary targets than monetary targets have given to the
Bundesbank. Unfair because the Bundesbank has always published in its
monthly reports an analysis of trends in velocity, and so its explanations of the
recent deviation of M3 growth from the target range carry conviction. And it is
intriguing to note that at home, both measures of velocity have stabilised in the
past three years. Perhaps broad money will in future be a more accurate indicator
of inflationary trends than in the early to mid- 1980s.
The use of an inflation target does not mean that there is no intermediate
target. Rather, the intermediate target is the expected level of inflation at some
future date chosen to allow for the lag between changes in interest rates and the
resulting changes in inflation. In practice, we use a forecasting horizon of two
years. It is absolutely crucial to understand that the inflation target does not
mean that policy is set according to the current rate of inflation. The latest
inflation rate is relevant only in so far as it affects the projection for inflation
some two years ahead.
The reason for announcing and following an intermediate target is to
convince private sector agents that the authorities will not spring inflation
surprises on them, and that the inflation target is credible. In principle, the
authorities could adjust official interest rates until the current projection for
inflation was at the mid-point of the target range. In a recent paper, Hall and
Mankiw (1993) use the analogy of steering a large ship — a highly specialised
task because there are long lags between adjusting the rudder and the actual
movement of the ship. After the voyage, the quality of the captain can be judged
by the course actually followed, but how are the passengers to appraise his
actions while still at sea? Simple rules of thumb which are easy to monitor will
tell them whether the captain is following his pre-announced course. But in
difficult waters, simple rules do not exist. The passengers may feel that an
independent judgement based on expert knowledge of the tides, wind, engine
speed and rudder settings is helpful in judging the captain’s performance. Of
course, if the captain’s qualifications and reputation were sufficient, there would
be no need to monitor his performance so carefully, but if he has steered on to
the rocks before, the passengers might wish to ask for an independent view. That
is one role of the Bank’s Inflation Report.
Of the alternative intermediate targets that have been suggested, the most
serious candidate is a nominal income or GDP target. This has an impeccable
pedigree with support from James Meade, Sir Samuel Brittan and Charles Bean
in the UK, and Robert Hall and Greg Mankiw in the US. Nominal income rules
were proposed to reduce the volatility of real output in the face of shocks to the
economy. Their attraction depends upon the nature of those shocks. But many of
the benefits associated with nominal income targets can also be obtained by theMonetary Policy in the UK
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appropriate interpretation of an inflation target. Consider an adverse supply
shock such as a deterioration in the terms of trade. An increase in prices from
this source might threaten the inflation target. Action to hit the target would
involve a fall in output. But if in these circumstances inflation is allowed to rise
to the top of the target range, or the range is explicitly adjusted, then there is no
adverse output consequence. The choice of an appropriate range provides the
headroom necessary for dealing with shocks. Of course, the opposite is true
when the shock leads to a favourable price response. It was considerations of this
sort which led the Bank to develop its measure of underlying inflation which
abstracts from the effects of changes in indirect taxes. A one-off change in the
price level in response to higher indirect taxes might sensibly be accommodated.
Hence the measure of inflation over which to define the target would be the
Bank’s RPIY measure. But if the issue is understood, then an explanation of why
the RPIX target might be breached temporarily should suffice.
FIGURE 3
RPIY Inflation: Out-Turns and Projections
Note: The range is defined as the central projections plus or minus the absolute average error on RPIX inflation
projections since 1985. These projections have all been based on the assumption that short-term nominal
interest rates are unchanged.
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FIGURE 4
RPIY Level: Current and Previous Projections
Source: Bank of England Inflation Report, may 1994.
To be formal for a moment, a range for target inflation corresponds to a state-
contingent inflation target, and hence can match the flexibility of nominal
income targets. An inflation target also has two advantages. First, it enables the
government to make clear its commitment to low inflation and faster growth as
separate objectives to be attained by different means. Any government which
raised the target for nominal income growth on the grounds that its supply-side
measures were beginning to work would come under the suspicion that it was
wavering in its anti-inflationary zeal. Separate objectives for growth and
inflation prevent any confusion. Second, the data for retail price inflation are
available on a more timely basis and are not revised. Data on nominal GDP
arrive several months later and are often revised. For example, the growth of
nominal GDP in the fourth quarter of 1992 was initially estimated — in March
1993 — to have been a fall of 0.4 per cent. The latest (though not necessarily
final) estimate is of a rise of 0.5 per cent, a difference of one percentage point in
a quarterly growth rate. This second experience is not unusual.
For these reasons, an inflation target can combine the advantages of nominal
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There are a number of issues involved in making an inflation target
operational. I have already mentioned the choice of price index. There are others.
The width of the target range reflects considerations such as the volatility of the
external shocks that are likely to hit the economy, and the mid-point of the range
depends upon the extent to which official measures of inflation underestimate
the degree of quality improvement in products purchased by UK households.
Research to date suggests that quality improvement may result in an
overstatement of inflation of anywhere between ½ per cent and 1½ per cent a
year.
There is also a choice between stating the objective in terms of a price level
or an inflation rate — the latter accommodating base drift. In most
circumstances, the latter is preferable because it reduces the fluctuations in
output in meeting the target. But there are occasions when looking directly at the
price level is more useful, especially when it is important to distinguish between
price jumps and inflation. One such is the experience of inflation over the past
few months. A squeeze on retail margins in the first quarter of this year has led
to an extremely low level of recorded inflation — defined as the increase in
prices over the previous 12 months. This is good news. But it has the
consequence that, unless a further squeeze on margins takes place next year, the
level of inflation will rise in the first quarter of 1995 as the price falls of this
year drop out of the 12-month comparison. The implications for both the price
level and inflation are shown in Figures 3 and 4, which plot the Bank projections
for the behaviour of RPIY. A shock of the kind represented by a squeeze on
margins leads to lower inflation in the short term followed by a rise, even though
the price level is always below the level previously expected. In this sense, good
news on inflation today can sometimes create awkward developments to be
explained in the future. Again, a clear explanation of the economics of what is
happening to inflation helps to maintain credibility.
IV. HOW IS MONETARY POLICY DECIDED?
For operational purposes, the inflation target approach requires a projection of
inflation over an appropriate forecast horizon. When the then Chancellor invited
the Bank to publish its own report on inflation in 1992, it was the preparation of
such a projection that he had in mind. As an example, Figure 5 shows the Bank
projection made in May 1994, where inflation is defined as the rate of retail
price inflation excluding mortgage interest payments, over a forecast horizon of
two years to the first quarter of 1996. It is absolutely crucial not to be misled by
a spurious degree of precision in forecasting. That is why we do not publish a
single number but present a chart which shows the most likely outcome
(technically, the mode of our forecast distribution of out-turns for inflation)
surrounded by a shaded area which indicates a band defined by the average
forecast errors made over the past 10 years. And in the text of the InflationFiscal Studies
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Report we go to some lengths to describe the circumstances in which inflation
could differ from the central projection. An appreciation of the uncertainty of the
outcome is crucial to the formulation of policy. And it is an illusion to think that
the use of an intermediate target would give greater precision. For if that
intermediate target variable produced a more accurate forecast of inflation, then
it should have been incorporated into the original projection itself.
FIGURE 5
RPIX Inflation: Out-Turns and Projections
Note: The range is defined as the central projections plus or minus the absolute average error on RPIX inflation
projections since 1985. These projections have all been based on the assumption that short-term nominal
interest rates are unchanged.
Source: Bank of England Inflation Report, May 1994.
The process of reaching a judgement on the direction in which inflation is
headed over the next two years is embedded in the monthly cycle of meetings on
monetary policy. These start with informal meetings among economists. In the
Bank, the analysis of the latest economic data and the assessment of the outlook
for inflation are presented to a Bank-wide Monetary Review Committee, chaired
by the Deputy Governor. The conclusions of this meeting are presented to the
Governor and Directors of the Bank, who transmit to the Treasury their
assessment of the economic situation and policy recommendations. There then
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Sir Terry Burns. The minutes of this meeting are circulated, among others, to the
Chancellor and Governor just in advance of their monthly monetary meeting. A
record of the discussion among officials is included in the published minutes of
the monthly monetary meetings in an introductory section entitled ‘Monetary
and Economic Developments’. Following this summary, the published minutes
report the discussion, starting with the views of the Governor, which are
provided in written form for inclusion in the minutes. The ensuing discussion is
reported anonymously, and the conclusions describe the Chancellor’s summing-
up and his decision. The numbers attending both the meeting of officials and the
Chancellor–Governor meeting are much smaller than the attendance at the
Federal Open Market Committee in the US.
The benefits of a regular monthly cycle of meetings are apparent to all who
participate in it. The whole process is geared to a monthly decision on the level
of interest rates determined by economic arguments. Those producing the
analysis feel that their work is more closely related to the outcome. That is an
incentive to produce better work. Of course, some outside commentators may
disagree with the policy decisions, but the process of reaching a decision is now
more systematic and, I believe, more transparent to those affected by the
decisions.
FIGURE 6
Nominal Implied Forward Rates
Source: Bank of EnglandFiscal Studies
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V. TRANSPARENCY, OPENNESS AND ACCOUNTABILITY
The inflation target was only part of the new framework for monetary policy
adopted following our departure from the ERM. The other part was a series of
institutional changes designed to bolster the credibility of the commitment to low
inflation. The need for this was apparent from the consequences of 16 September
1992. I called this day ‘Grey Wednesday’ because, although it enabled the UK to
rebalance monetary and fiscal policy in a way precluded at the time by our
membership of the ERM, it also led to an immediate loss of credibility in the
commitment to price stability. This can be seen from the rise in implied future
short-term interest rates between just before and just after ‘Grey Wednesday’, as
shown in Figure 6.
There is no doubt that the most effective way to obtain credibility is to build
up a track record of low inflation. That has been the achievement of the
Bundesbank. In the wake of our departure from the ERM, and the poor track
record of the UK over more than 20 years, it was important to put in place
measures which would help to establish, at least in a small way, the credibility of
the commitment to price stability. Since October 1992, four major institutional
changes have been made:
(1) The monthly monetary meetings between the Chancellor and Governor have
been formalised and are now the forum in which decisions on interest rates
are made. The Chancellor makes the final decision based on the advice
given at the meeting. The timetable of meetings is announced several
months in advance.
  (2) In October 1992, the Chancellor asked the Bank to produce its own
independent verdict on progress toward meeting the inflation target to be
published in a new Bank of England quarterly Inflation Report. This
followed discussions between the Treasury and the Bank, and the
production of a dummy report which convinced the Governor and
Chancellor of the merits of the idea. The first Report appeared in February
1993, and in total six have now been published. Since the autumn of 1993,
these reports have been shown to the Treasury only in final form when they
have been dispatched to the printers. This has saved resources of time and
energy at both ends of town. The obsession with drafting (I distinguish
between drafting and good writing) in the official world has too often been
at the expense of substantive policy discussions.
(3) On 13 April this year, the Chancellor announced that he would accept the
recommendation of the Treasury and Civil Service Committee to publish
the minutes of his monthly monetary meetings with the Governor. These
minutes are published two weeks after the subsequent meeting has taken
place, which in most cases means a lag of six weeks between the meeting
and publication of the minutes. Again, this decision followed anMonetary Policy in the UK
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experimental period of seven months during which the minutes had been
prepared on a trial basis.
(4) In November 1993, the Bank was given discretion over the timing of
interest rate changes, with the understanding that any change in rates
decided by the Chancellor at a monthly meeting would be implemented
before the next meeting. In practice, unless there was a compelling reason
for delay, any such move would happen sooner rather than later. To wait
until after the next round of economic statistics (usually two weeks after the
monthly meeting) would run the risk that the new data might cast doubt on
the wisdom of the decision. In principle, decisions could be made
conditional on subsequent published statistics or market reactions, although
this has not happened to date. And major market disturbances, in the
foreign exchange market for example, might lead to an additional meeting
which in turn would result in an additional set of minutes after the
appropriate delay.
In addition to these measures, there have been two other innovations. First,
whenever interest rates are changed, a press notice is issued outlining the reasons
for the change. Second, on the day of the monthly monetary meetings, the
Treasury publishes a Monthly Monetary Report which describes the most
important economic data available to the participants in the meeting.
What do these changes add up to? In the first LSE Bank of England Lecture,
the then Governor, Lord Kingsdown, described the measures announced in the
Chancellor’s 1992 Mansion House speech — in particular the new Inflation
Report — in these terms: ‘while they may appear to be a small step for Britain,
they are a giant leap for the authorities’. The further changes made subsequently,
and, in particular, the decision to publish the minutes of the monthly Chancellor–
Governor meetings, certainly amount to an additional leap. The policy advice
tendered by the Bank to the Chancellor is now available to the public not after 30
years but after six weeks. To go from 30 years to six weeks is, by any standard,
more than a small step. It is open government in practice. The raw material on
which assessment of monetary policy is based is not secret — the statistics are in
the public domain. Of course, there are other areas of policy — the provision of
lender-of-last-resort assistance, for example — in which confidentiality of
information is important and secrecy may be essential to the success of the
operation. But monetary policy can and should be a matter for open public
debate. The irreversibility of the decision to publish the minutes has been
underlined by the announcement by the Shadow Chancellor, Gordon Brown, that
a future Labour government would continue to publish the minutes, and I
welcome that.
Openness can improve credibility by helping private sector agents predict
how the monetary authorities will react to developments in the economy. The
Inflation Report has already improved public understanding of the Bank’sFiscal Studies
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thinking on inflation, and publication of the minutes of the monthly monetary
meetings should, in time, increase the accuracy of market expectations of the
authorities’ ‘reaction function’. Indeed, the commentaries of City and Press
scribblers have already shown an increased awareness of official thinking, based
not on speculation about ‘who said what?’ but on an appreciation of our analysis
of the economy. As a result, over time the minutes should contain fewer
surprises, thus contributing to the stability of macroeconomic policy.
There is one further important consequence of openness and transparency —
greater public accountability of the Bank. In the debate on the role and status of
the Bank of England, one important point is in danger of being overlooked. The
changes which the Chancellor and his predecessor have introduced have made
the Bank more accountable for its policy advice than it has ever been in its
history. There will not be any doubt about the advice tendered by the Bank. Our
representations to the Treasury, and the Governor’s advice to the Chancellor at
their monthly meetings, are expressed in totally unambiguous terms. It will no
longer be possible for misleading impressions to be formed about the nature of
the Bank’s past advice on interest rates, based on incorrect interpretations of
tortuous circumlocutions expressed in that special language known as ‘Bankese’.
One consequence of greater public accountability has been the spur to
improved performance within the Bank. The publication of our analysis and
advice is a great incentive to getting it right. I am one of those who believe that
the strongest incentive to provide good economic advice is the prospect of
having to defend that advice in public. Robert Solow, the American economist
and Nobel prize-winner, said once that three qualities were needed for the study
of economics: faith, hope and clarity — and the greatest of these is clarity. I
believe that the new monetary framework in the UK exhibits clarity, as well as
faith and hope. If the Chancellor rejects the Bank’s advice, that will be clear.
The Bank will not have to obfuscate if a decision is made with which it
disagrees. And future Chancellors will no longer experience the frustration of
seeing the Press assume that the Bank must have given good advice if it did not.
Both the Treasury and the Bank have welcomed the opportunity to make clear
our respective views. Far from creating tensions between the two institutions, the
change has led to a sense of relief that attention can be focused on substance, not
form. What better celebration of 300 years of central banking history than the
opportunity to say what we think in plain English. Of course, there will be those
who think that no group of economists could possibly talk in plain English for
more than a minute without repetition and deviation, if not hesitation, and a
descent into economic jargon. Doubtless we shall fail to live up to the standards
of the King’s English, but try we shall.Monetary Policy in the UK
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VI. CONCLUSIONS
Mr Chairman, I have tried this evening to answer four questions — why does the
Bank attach so much importance to the objective of price stability? what is the
framework within which decisions on monetary policy are made? how are those
decisions made? and why are openness and accountability vital to the success of
the framework? The new framework, based on an explicit inflation target,
focuses attention on price stability as the underlying objective of policy, and
avoids putting all one’s eggs in the basket of a single variable as the intermediate
target. It does, I believe, correspond with the way most monetary authorities
behave in practice, and, if that is the case, then why not be open about it?
I also promised to offer an alternative metaphor to the mistaken ‘inflation is
dead’ school of thought. The control of inflation is like weight-watching. If you
allow yourself to become overweight — excess inflationary pressure — a rather
unpleasant crash diet may be necessary for a while. But alternating between
binge and starvation — boom and bust — is not a sensible way to live. The only
satisfactory solution is to find a healthy diet which allows you to eat well on a
sustainable basis. So it is with monetary policy.
I have suggested that bringing down inflation is like giving up smoking, and
keeping it down is like learning to eat and live healthily. I am not sure that either
the Governor or Chancellor would approve of these analogies, but I do know that
both are fully committed to the underlying objective of price stability.
The role of the Bank of England has changed in important ways in the past 18
months. What of the future? Both the Treasury and Civil Service and the Roll
Committees argued last year for greater statutory independence for the Bank. As
I have argued, much has already been achieved. But I have no doubt that the
future influence of the Bank of England will depend less on changes to its legal
status and more on the quality of its advice and intellectual contribution to
discussion of the British economy. If our analysis of the British economy is
correct, we shall influence policy decisions; if not, we shall be ignored. As
Michael Bruno, the former Governor of the Bank of Israel, has argued in a
different context, ‘the special status that the Bank of Israel, and its Governor,
have in the Israeli economy derives at least as much from intellectual leadership
... as from its monetary, foreign exchange or bank supervision functions’ (Bruno,
1994). He goes on to quote David Horowitz, who founded the Bank of Israel,
that the central bank fulfil the dual role of ‘Matzpen and Matzpoun’ in Hebrew,
both a ‘compass and a conscience’ for the economy. I do not envisage the Bank
of England being required to play quite this role in Britain, but the Bank does
have a special responsibility to champion the cause of price stability. Nor is this
a new position for the Bank. In 1923, Maynard Keynes dedicated his Tract on
Monetary Reform to the Governors and Court of the Bank of England who, and I
quote, ‘now and for the future have a much more difficult and anxious task
entrusted to them than in former days’.Fiscal Studies
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The pursuit of price stability is an endless marathon, not a sprint for the line.
As Alan Greenspan said in an interview last year, ‘You never reach the point
where you shut up shop and break out the champagne. Nor should you’.
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